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Abstract We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that7
meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influ-8
ence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project,9
participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We10
provide either public or only private information about personal values. This pro-11
duces two distinct public provision games which are experimentally implemented12
and analysed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, par-13
ticipants do not rely on bidding their own personal values as an obvious simple14
heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes.15
Rather, they yield to strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected16
by projects’ characteristics, the provision mechanism leads to the implementation17
of the most efficient project mostly.18
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21 Introduction22
In the real world projects that may benefit one party but harm another party23
are frequently observed. Such projects may give rise to the so-called “Not In My24
Backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome if they improve general welfare but generate costs25
for the individuals living close to the project who, as a consequence, oppose its26
implementation (e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). As an example, building a27
new railway may improve the general welfare of the community. However, while it28
may benefit some individuals, such as the traders in the community, at the same29
time, it may harm farmers whose land is needed to build it. Therefore, farmers30
might oppose and try to prevent the implementation of the railway.31
Following the seminal work of Rapoport and Chammah (1965) on the Pris-32
oner’s Dilemma, the provision of public goods has been the object of a variety of33
experimental studies. Generally, participants in a public goods game are asked to34
contribute to a public good that generates positive externalities for the potential35
contributors, irrespectively of the actual amount contributed (Bergstrom et al.,36
1986). The public good is usually assumed to yield benefits to all participants and37
the size of benefits is usually found to positively affect the contributions to the38
public good (see, for a review, Ledyard, 1995). In an attempt to replicate field39
conditions, experimental studies have introduced extensions to this basic setting,40
investigating among other the effect of heterogeneous valuations of the good (e.g.,41
Bagnoli and McKee, 1991; Rondeau et al., 1999) and of negative externalities (e.g.,42
Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998). However, the empirically relevant case of43
public projects yielding benefits to some and harming other participants has only44
recently been addressed in the experimental literature (e.g., Gu¨th et al., 2011).45
For projects that benefit some and harm others, it is essential that the rules46
governing the choice and the allocation of the overall benefit from the project47
are fair and that equal weight is attributed to each participant. Gu¨th and Kliemt48
(2013) axiomatically derive a procedurally fair institution. Individuals involved in49
decision-making within this institution bid on the provision of a set of projects,50
3whose provision points are publicly known. Through their bids, participants state51
the maximum contribution they are willing to make to the project given the in-52
formation available.1 The bids can be negative and, if low enough, veto the imple-53
mentation of the project.54
Assuming the common measuring rod of money for whatever the concerns are,55
fairness is guaranteed with respect to the publicly observable bids. The fairness56
condition implies that participants obtain the same net benefit with respect to57
their bids. The “status quo” is maintained when the bids do not justify provision,58
whereas when bids render implementation justifiable, the set of projects with the59
largest surplus, i.e. the largest difference between the sum of the bids and the60
costs, is selected.61
The procedurally fair institution of Gu¨th and Kliemt (2013) constitutes the62
game form implemented experimentally by Gu¨th et al. (2011) and also in this63
paper (see Section 2.1 for a detailed description). Gu¨th et al. (2011) compare64
bids and provision rates for a public good project that harms some and benefits65
others and for a less efficient traditional public good project. The authors label the66
latter “mixed feelings” project. Gu¨th et al. (2011) experimentally study bids and67
provision rates in the simple case where two players, who have common knowledge68
about personal values, bid for two projects, with one player always having higher69
values than the other. Their results show that, while participants generally succeed70
in selecting the most efficient project, the provision frequency of the mixed-feelings71
project reduces when in competition with the traditional public good.72
Compared to Gu¨th et al. (2011), we investigate mixed feelings in a much richer73
experimental setting, with groups of three players that bid for seven projects over74
five different sets of personal values and costs (we call these sets “prospects”).75
Moreover, unlike Gu¨th et al. (2011), we study behaviour in two alternative infor-76
mation conditions: a public information setting and a private information setting.77
In both, participants know the project costs, but in the private information setting78
1 Kunreuther and Portney (1991) in the context of the NIMBY literature propose a similar
approach to guide decision making for the siting of noxious facilities.
4they are only aware of their own personal values, whereas in the public information79
setting they also know others’ personal values and are, thus, able to calculate the80
social benefits of each project. This innovation in the experimental design allows us81
to verify the applicability of the institution in absence of the common knowledge82
requirements of game theory and to control for the impact of social preferences.83
Furthermore, the complex experimental setting adopted brings us closer to field84
conditions and allows us to investigate the role of costs, heterogeneity in values,85
negative personal values, and social benefits on bidding and provision.86
Our results show that there is a general tendency to post a bid lower than87
one’s own personal value (i.e., underbidding), and, in turn, this affects the cre-88
ation of surplus. Negative personal values promote underbidding and endanger89
the implementation of efficient projects. Also heterogeneous valuations have a90
negative impact on bids, echoing an established finding in the experimental lit-91
erature on public goods according to which homogeneity increases contributions92
(Ledyard, 1995). Furthermore, variance in personal values may explain failures to93
provide the most efficient project because it inhibits coordinating on bids that94
ensure implementation. We find that when all personal values are the same, the95
most efficient project has the highest implementation rate across all prospects.96
With reference to the two information conditions, our results show that common97
knowledge of others’ evaluations does not substantially affect bidding behaviour98
and project implementation. When deciding how much to bid, participants seem99
to focus on their own personal values. Behaviour of this kind is compatible with100
the axiomatic derivation of game forms rather than proper games formalised in101
Gu¨th and Kliemt (2013) that does not require common knowledge assumptions.102
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2.1 presents the theoretical basis103
(game format) underlying the experiment; Section 2.2 outlines the experimental104
design and the behavioural predictions; Section 2.3 describes the procedure fol-105
lowed to conduct the experiment; Section 3 presents the results of the experiment;106
Section 4 discusses and concludes.107
52 Method108
2.1 The Game Format109
To derive our mechanism, we postulate three requirements, two of which are rather110
obvious. Each participant i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2 submits a bid bi(S)111
for each different combination (subset) S of a certain finite number of possible112
measures Ω. Each subset is associated with known costs (C(S)).2113
Requirement 1 Efficiency with respect to bids114
If ∀ ∅ = S ⊂ Ω,115
n∑
i=1
bi(S) < C(S), then S
∗ = ∅116
Otherwise, S∗ 6= ∅ and ∀ S ⊂ Ω117
n∑
i=1
bi(S
∗)− C(S∗) ≥
n∑
i=1
bi(S)− C(S).118
This ensures that for a subset which is implemented the sum of all bids must be119
equal or higher than its costs. Among all subsets, only a subset S∗ with the highest120
surplus is selected. In the experiment, the surplus (SP ) of each project is defined121
as the difference between the sum of the bids for that project by the n participants122
in a group (
n∑
i=1
bi) and the cost C of that project (SP =
n∑
i=1
bi−C). Requirement123
1 states that the project with the highest surplus, when this is non-negative, is124
implemented. If the highest surplus is negative, no project is implemented.125
Requirement 2 Cost balancing126
n∑
i=1
pi(S
∗) = C(S∗)127
If S∗ 6= ∅, denote by pi(S∗) the payment required from each i ∈ N . Require-128
ment 2 ensures that the sum of all payments covers the costs.3129
Requirement 3 Equal payoff with respect to bids130
bi(S
∗)− pi(S∗) = bj(S∗)− pj(S∗) = 4 for all i, j = 1, . . . , n131
2 Costs could be negative, for example, when implementation is generating revenues rather
than costs. However, this possibility is neglected here.
3 One could allow for taxing or subsidising public provision; for example in the form of
n∑
i=1
pi(S
∗) + c = C(S∗) for some given c ∈ R. However, this is neglected here.
6The main requirement, allowing to characterise many institutions in practical132
use for centuries (Gu¨th, 2011), postulates equal treatment of all parties according133
to what can be monitored objectively, i.e. the bids. The difference 4 between the134
bid and the actual payment, i.e., the players’ payoff with respect to bids, must be135
the same for all participants.4 From these requirements it follows for the selected136
subset S∗, if it is not empty, that the payment is the bid minus an equal share of137
the highest non-negative surplus.5 Thus, the payments are computed as follows:138
pi(S
∗) = bi(S∗)−
( n∑
j=1
bi(S
∗)− C(S∗)
)
/n for all i ∈ N . 6139
In order to implement this mechanism in the experimental setting, we need to140
assign exogenously given personal values vi(S) to participants. Personal values141
measure the pleasure or displeasure for each participant in case the subset is142
implemented. To illustrate this point, take the example of a community that is143
made up of families living in a block of flats. A family living on the third floor144
will benefit more from an elevator than a family living on the ground floor. In our145
experiment this will be translated in a higher personal value for the family living146
on the third floor.7147
The overall benefit to the community, social benefit (SB(S)), is captured by the148
difference between the sum of the personal values and the cost. The overall benefit149
to the individual is captured by her payoff, understood as net gains compared to the150
status quo denoted by ∅. The payoff pii for participant i is the difference between151
her personal value and her payment for the selected subset: pii = vi(S
∗)− pi(S∗),152
4 Note that this implies envy-free net-trades according to bids (Gu¨th, 1986) and truly equal
payoffs in case of each bidder i bidding for each subset S his exogeneously given personal
value. Furthermore, it is an essential feature of our approach to allow for negative bids. Any
proportionality principle would require an arbitrary lower bound for bids and this questions
the universal application of the mechanism.
5 This proves an important voluntariness property or veto principle since by bidding suffi-
ciently low one can veto all sets S 6= ∅.
6 Requirement 3 implies bi(S
∗) − pi(S∗) = 4 ∈ R or bi(S∗) = pi(S∗) +4 for all i ∈ N .
Due to
n∑
i=1
bi(S
∗) =
n∑
i=1
pi(S
∗) + n4 and
n∑
i=1
pi(S
∗) = C(S∗), we obtain 4 =
( n∑
j=1
bi(S
∗) −
C(S∗)
)
/n ≥ 0 and thus pi(S∗) = bi(S∗)−
( n∑
j=1
bi(S
∗)− C(S∗)
)
/n for all i ∈ N .
7 Personal values should not be interpreted as endowments, but as benefits/ disbenefits from
implementing a certain project, irrespective of the reasons that led to this valuation.
7with vi(∅) − pi(∅) = 0 − 0 = 0. Given the definition of payments pi(S∗), we get:153
pii = vi − bi + SPn with SP =
n∑
i=1
bi(S
∗)−C(S∗) for i = 1, ..., n. Although we will154
introduce personal values for all possible alternatives, the mechanism proposed for155
voluntary public provision does not need such exogenously given evaluations to156
collectively provide community projects. In this sense, our mechanism resembles157
democratic voting rules which only define the set of voters and how many votes158
are required for certain outcomes. In game-theoretic terminology, this means that159
the mechanism analysed here only defines a game form but no proper (Bayesian)160
game.161
For exogenously given personal values, the mechanism would yield a well-162
defined game — and not just a game form — when these values are assumed163
to be commonly known. We will implement this well-defined game experimentally164
in one of our two treatments, the public information treatment, where all personal165
values and costs are known to all participants. If the personal values are only pri-166
vately known, as in our private information treatment, a well-defined (Bayesian)167
game would have to rely on commonly known (consistent or inconsistent) beliefs168
concerning them. Our mechanism like democratic voting rules and, more gener-169
ally, legally codified mechanisms does not require well-defined games (see Gu¨th,170
2011, for a discussion of public procurement auctions in this sense). It is an impor-171
tant advantage of our approach that the mechanism is applicable, irrespectively172
of whether the requirements of common knowledge are granted.8173
Under standard assumptions, every bidding strategy bi(·) specifying bids bi(S)174
higher than the personal value of bidder i for some subset S is weakly dominated,175
i.e. the bidding mechanism is overbidding proof.9 However, the mechanism is not176
incentive-compatible since bidders can gain by underbidding their personal values.177
In case of commonly known personal values and at least one subset S of Ω which is178
8 The same applies to democratic election rules and, more generally, to legally codified
mechanisms which must be applicable across the board, i.e. even to the usual “ill-defined
cases”.
9 Overbidding may result in a pocket-money loss in the experiment and in a disadvantageous
final allocation for those overbidding relative to those not overbidding. This makes overbidding
quite unlikely also for individuals endowed with conventional social preference.
8efficient according to personal values, the most efficient subset S∗ can be guaran-179
teed by usually a large multiplicity of equilibria in weakly undominated strategies,180
similar to what typically happens in threshold public goods.10 For each of these181
equilibria, the sum of the bids would exactly cover the cost of the most efficient182
subset S∗ with — due to overbidding proofness — no individual bid bi(S∗) exceed-183
ing i’s true personal value vi(S
∗) and similar provisions for all alternative subsets.184
But, as already stressed above, practically implementable mechanisms should be185
applicable across the board, that is, even without the common knowledge require-186
ments of game theory.11187
2.2 Experimental Design and Behavioural Predictions188
In our experiment we consider a community N = {1, 2, 3} with three members and189
five different prospects. Each prospect contains seven subsets of measures. Here-190
after, for simplicity, we refer to each subset of measures as a project. Each project191
is associated with costs (C) and personal values (v1, v2, v3). Participants are ran-192
domly matched in groups of three. Two alternative experimental treatments are193
implemented in a between-subjects design. In one condition participants are in-194
formed only of their own personal values (Private information). In the alternative195
condition participants are informed also of the personal values of the other two196
group members and are aware that the others are informed too (Public informa-197
tion).198
When introducing and justifying our mechanism it should be clear that we do199
not subscribe to the usual request for a game theoretic benchmark. Actually, for200
one treatment, namely the one with commonly known personal values, a multi-201
plicity of equilibria exists that all implement the most efficient subset S∗ of Ω202
as characterised informally above. We could single out the one with equal payoffs203
10 A project is efficient according to personal values when the sum of the personal values for
some S at least covers its cost C(S).
11 This, of course, applies also to mechanisms which are dominance solvable. However, such
mechanisms are more often than not impossible (see Gu¨th, 2011).
9for all bidders (according to personal values rather than only according to bids)204
if one cares for a unique benchmark solution. This equilibrium requires that all205
bidders underbid their personal value for S∗ by the same amount. For the case of206
privately known personal values, a benchmark solution would require commonly207
known prior beliefs, which we intentionally did not try to induce experimentally208
to demonstrate the general applicability of our approach, irrespective of the em-209
pirically unrealistic assumption of common knowledge.210
The institution we experimentally investigate is based on three requirements211
leading to a fair and efficient outcome with respect to bids. Fairness is defined212
with reference to bids (procedural fairness) and can lead to different payoffs, i.e.,213
it does not necessarily lead to fair outcomes with respect to payoffs. However, if all214
participants bid their personal values, the payoffs are equal. Thus, general bidding215
of one’s personal values would generate a “fair and efficient outcome” both with216
respect to bids and with respect to personal values. We focus here on procedural217
fairness as resulting from the equality of payoffs with respect to bids.218
While procedural fairness is still quite unexplored in economic studies, a lot219
of attention has been paid in recent years to outcome-based fairness and to so-220
cial preferences in general. Several sources of fairness have been identified in the221
literature, like inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ock-222
enfels, 2000), altruism (e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 2002), and welfare-enhancing223
preferences (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002). In our framework, other regarding224
concerns are not exogenously given but a result of analysing a given social decision225
problem. Actually, one of the intuitions of procedural fairness is that procedural226
fairness may crowd out other regarding concerns. This can be seen from sports227
contests or markets which are usually procedurally fair and hardly ever offer evi-228
dence of other regarding concerns, at least when entitlement is granted. We do not229
provide here a direct test of outcome-based social preferences, but the two infor-230
mation treatments provide us with some control of their relevance in the setting231
under investigation. While in the private information condition considerations of232
10
this kind should not play a relevant role, in the public information treatment they233
could.12 Thus, differences in bids between the two conditions may potentially be234
ascribed to social preferences based on outcomes.235
With reference to cognitive aspects of the decision process, the complexity of236
the mechanism seems to require a substantial amount of resources when choosing237
a specific course of actions. In particular, underbidding requires quite complex238
strategic considerations which participants might want to avoid. Bidding one’s239
own personal values could therefore qualify as an obvious heuristic (see, more240
generally, on heuristics, Gigerenzer and Todd, 2000). Hence, this is a possible241
focal “fair” benchmark to start from.13 Indeed, one of the reasons to study rather242
complex prospects is to provide a basis for relying on heuristics rather than on243
strategic underbidding. However, bidding personal values is not in general a (Nash)244
equilibrium.14245
For example, if the costs of the project are 15 and the personal values of the246
three players are 12, -4 and 25, respectively, bidding personal values leads to a247
surplus of 18 and a payoff per person of 6. However, in this situation, players have248
an incentive to underbid. If the participant with personal value of 12 lowers her249
bid from 12 to 0, the project would still be implemented but she would earn more,250
namely 12+2=14 instead of 6. However, she can do even better by bidding -6. In251
this case, she would get all the social benefit (18).15252
This example clearly demonstrates that bidding personal values is weakly dom-253
inated and that one should expect strategic underbidding (bid shading), similarly254
to what happens in the provision point literature (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989;255
Marks and Croson, 1998; Cadsby and Maynes, 1999) and experimental first-price256
auctions (Kagel, 1995). It has to be expected that many participants will under-257
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.
13 The same outcome would be achieved if all participants under- or overbid by the same
amount; however, this seems rather unlikely, even when personal values are commonly known
and quite unimaginable when not.
14 Exceptional cases are when personal values add up to the costs.
15 The same logic applies to participants with negative personal values that may try to
increase their payoff by posting a negative bid smaller than their personal value, provided of
course that the other bids cover the costs and compensate her negative bid.
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stand such underbidding incentives and even more so with more familiarity. Thus,258
even when first considering bidding personal values as an easy option they later259
might tend to underbid their personal value. While we expect that, behaviourally,260
participants will take their personal values as a reference for their bids, we also261
expect systematic underbidding, especially when personal values are only privately262
known. According to the anchoring heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), par-263
ticipants may underbid by some amount (see also Gu¨th et al., 2011), even though264
the extent of underbidding can hardly be predicted. In contrast, overbidding should265
be very unlikely as it is weakly dominated and can even lead to negative payoffs.266
Rondeau et al. (1999) in their review of the provision point literature find that267
contributions range from 40.2% to 85.0% of the induced values.268
In our work, we focus on the effects of the information setting (private versus269
public) and of different prospects on bidding behaviour. We expect that knowing270
other participants’ values will affect bidding behaviour because participants can271
calculate the social benefit of each project. This should render implementing the272
most efficient project more likely. We thus expect more equal underbidding and273
higher implementation rates of the most efficient projects in the public than in the274
private information setting (Hypothesis 1). Other-regarding concerns like inequity275
aversion and welfare enhancement may further promote the emergence of such a276
pattern. We also expect the size of costs and personal values to influence bidding277
behaviour and provision.278
[Table 1 about here]279
Table 1 provides a description of the 5 prospects implemented in our experi-280
ment. Prospect 1 is our baseline prospect and the values in prospects from 2 to 5281
in Table 1 are obtained as variations of Prospect 1. In Prospects 1 to 4 we keep282
the social benefit of the most efficient project (with respect to social benefit) con-283
stant (namely 54). The aim is to explore how the implementation of projects with284
the same potential welfare gain (expressed by the social benefit) is affected by285
different patterns of personal values and costs. In Prospects 2 to 4 we adjust both286
12
personal values and costs to test how different patterns of these affect bidding and287
implementation. Changing both personal values and costs allows us to explore a288
wider range of settings. Its drawback is that we cannot directly disentangle the289
effect of variations in costs and personal values by comparing the prospects, but290
only do so by using a multivariate regression analysis. In Prospect 5 we explore291
the effects on implementation of three projects with relatively high social benefit,292
one higher and the other lower than 54.293
In Prospect 2 we keep the social benefit of all the projects the same as in294
Prospect 1 by reducing the costs. Keeping the social benefit the same as in Prospect295
1 requires an equivalent change in the sum of personal values. By this manipulation296
we want to explore the impact of a cost reduction while keeping the social benefit297
unchanged. Experimental evidence has shown that lower implementation thresh-298
olds in public goods games, while decreasing contributions, increase the probability299
that public goods are implemented (Ledyard, 1995). In our context, the cost of a300
project may be interpreted as an implementation threshold. If people focus more301
on costs than on social benefits, it may be, in analogy to what happens in thresh-302
old public goods games, that projects with lower costs generate lower bids, but303
still are more likely to be implemented (Hypothesis 2). Of course, we cannot draw304
any conclusion directly from a comparison of the Prospects since more than one305
dimension needs to be changed at the same time. For this purpose, one has to refer306
to the regression analysis.307
In Prospect 3, all participants enjoy the same positive personal values but the308
social benefit of the projects is the same as in Prospects 1 and 2. Our main aim is to309
check for the impact of “equal personal values”. Highly unbalanced personal values310
render predictions about others’ behaviour more difficult and bidding behaviour311
more variable. When all participants are assigned the same personal value, it312
should be easier for them to predict other participants’ behaviour and to coordinate313
on bids ensuring project implementation or even equilibrium bids. Relying on314
evidence collected in public goods games, we expect higher variance in personal315
13
values to negatively affect contributions and, as a consequence, to have a negative316
effect on implementation. Thus, Prospect 3 should have the highest contribution317
levels and implementation rates (Hypothesis 3).16318
Prospect 4 comprises the largest number of negative personal values. Evidence319
about loss aversion and framing (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1991) suggests that nega-320
tive personal values should have a stronger impact on bids and on the implemen-321
tation than corresponding positive values. Particularly in the private information322
setting, negative personal values are expected to lead to higher underbidding (Hy-323
pothesis 4a).324
The seminal work of Schelling (1958) highlighted the importance of focal points325
for coordination and efficiency in strategic interactions. In this perspective, be-326
haviour in Prospects 4 and 5 allows us to test whether the salience of the most327
efficient project affects its likelihood of being implemented. In Prospect 4, the328
difference between the social benefit of the most efficient project and the second329
most efficient project is much larger than in prospects 1,2 and 3 (45 versus 15). We330
expect that the prominence of the most efficient project will improve coordination331
on this project (Hypothesis 4b). Further evidence about the importance of salience332
for the implementation of the most efficient project may come from Prospect 5.333
In this prospect, three projects (AB, AC and BC ) generate relatively high social334
benefits, with project BC being the most efficient (in terms of social benefit) and335
AB being second most efficient, with a social benefit equal to the highest social336
benefit in the other prospects. This may endanger the implementation of the most337
efficient project because its salience is attenuated by the other efficient projects338
(Hypothesis 5).339
Beyond the effects of costs, heterogeneity in values, negative values, and social340
benefit, however, the experiment should be understood as an exploratory study of a341
procedurally fair institution. The key objective is to learn about bidding behaviour342
16 In experimental bargaining games, asymmetries in payoffs often lead to bargaining failures
(Kagel et al., 1996; Schmitt, 2004). While in the bargaining literature this failure may be
attributed to conflicting fairness norms, this is not the case in our game, where the only
salient fair and efficient behaviour is bidding one’s personal value, even if it is negative.
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in the institution and to verify whether applying the proposed mechanism provides343
the project that delivers the highest social benefit.344
2.3 Participants and Procedures345
The experiment was run in Jena (Germany) at the laboratory of the Max Planck346
Institute of Economics. Participants were recruited among students of the Friedrich347
Schiller University of Jena using the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004). The com-348
puterised experiment was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree software349
(Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 57 participants took part in two experimental ses-350
sions in which the two information conditions were separately administered: 30351
individuals participated in the public information condition and 27 in the private352
information condition.353
Upon their arrival at the laboratory, participants were randomly allocated to354
cubicles inhibiting interaction with other participants. Each participant received355
written instructions and read them privately. After that, a member of staff read356
the instructions aloud and participants were given the opportunity to privately357
ask staff members for clarifications. The experiment started only after each par-358
ticipant had answered a control questionnaire checking their understanding of the359
instructions.360
Each participant in the experiment was exposed to all prospects and to all361
personal values of Table 1 over 15 independent rounds.17 During the experiment362
participants received no feedback (about the project implemented or bids of others363
in the group). We thus did not study learning dynamics but only wanted to check364
whether more familiarity with the complex setup affects behaviour and outcomes.365
At the end of the experiment, one of the 15 rounds was randomly selected for366
payment and participants were informed about the project that was implemented367
and about their payoff for that project. Payoffs in the experiment were added368
17 A series of Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests reveals that rounds based on the same prospect can
be pooled together.
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to a e5 show-up fee and payments were privately dispensed in cash at the end369
of the experiment. The instructions reminded participants that earnings in the370
experiment could be negative. In case of negative earnings, the following procedure371
was used: first, the show-up fee was used to cover the losses; second, when losses372
exceeded the show-up fee, participants could pay the difference out of pocket373
money or take part in a boring task (i.e., computing the frequency of letter “t”374
in a text), with the length of the task being proportional to losses not covered by375
the show-up fee.376
3 Results377
3.1 Bids378
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of bids for each combination of prospects379
and projects in the private and public information condition, respectively. The380
boxplots in each cell provide the conventional representation of the distributions381
of bids for each personal value (identified by a filled circle).382
[Figure 1 about here]383
In Figure 1, the median is always below the personal value. This signals a384
tendency to underbid one’s own personal value. This tendency seems to be stronger385
for higher (absolute) personal values.386
[Figure 2 about here]387
Comparing Figures 2 and 1, introducing common knowledge of personal values388
does not heavily affect bidding behaviour. The same pattern of choices emerging389
for the private information condition is observed also for the public information390
condition (Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests, all p-values≥ 0.429).18 This provides evi-391
dence against Hypothesis 1.392
18 To warrant independence of observations, the tests are performed employing average values
at the individual level.
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3.2 Bids and Personal Values393
Figure 3 focuses on relative deviations between bids and personal values. Specifi-394
cally, a measure of relative deviation for each project (Ri) is computed by taking395
the ratio of the difference between the bid for a given project bi and the personal396
value for that project vi and the absolute value of the personal value (Ri =
bi−vi
|vi| ).397
Figure 3 portrays the distribution of the individual-level average Ri, in the five398
distinct prospects of the private information and public information condition.399
[Figure 3 about here]400
Figure 3 confirms the prevalence of underbidding in participants’ behaviour.401
The distributions of relative deviations are generally located under the threshold402
(dashed line) separating overbidding from underbidding, both in the public and403
private information conditions. When comparing the two information conditions,404
no major differences are observed. The average relative deviations in the two con-405
ditions are very similar (continuous line) and no significant differences are observed406
when comparing the two conditions prospect by prospect (Wilcoxon Rank Sum407
tests, all p-values≥ 0.243).408
A series of Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests highlights some significant differences in409
relative deviations across distinct prospects. In the private information condition,410
underbidding is stronger for Prospect 2 than for all other prospects (all p-values411
< 0.05). In the public information condition, stronger underbidding is observed412
for Prospect 2 than for all other prospects (all p-values < 0.05), but Prospect 1413
(p-value=0.171). In line with Hypothesis 2, lower costs seem to deplete bids. As414
noted in 2.2, the results are indicative more than conclusive with regard to our415
hypotheses, as more than one dimension has changed.416
3.3 Implemented Projects417
The tendency of participants to post bids that are lower than their personal values418
negatively affects the creation of surplus and endangers the implementation of419
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projects. Figure 4 provides a comparison between the average surplus and the420
social benefit of each project in the two information conditions.421
[Figure 4 about here]422
Figure 4 shows how the strong underbidding observed in the experiment nega-423
tively affects the creation of a positive surplus, even for projects delivering positive424
social benefits. In terms of surplus creation, no major differences are observed be-425
tween the public and private information conditions. To complement the analysis426
of surplus creation, Table 2 reports on the frequency of implementation of each427
project. The frequencies in the table are computed taking into account all possible428
combinations of bids collected for that project in each round, irrespectively of the429
group to which participants belonged.19430
[Table 2 about here]431
Table 2 shows that the project delivering the highest social benefit is the most432
frequently implemented project, both in the public and private information con-433
dition. The highest frequency of implementation for the socially most desirable434
projects is registered in Prospect 3, for both information conditions (evidence in435
support of Hypothesis 3). In contrast, the lowest frequency of implementation for436
these projects is registered in Prospect 2 and in Prospect 5 for the private and437
public information condition, respectively. The latter points in the direction of438
Hypothesis 5, while the implementation problems registered in Prospect 2 conflict439
with our Hypothesis 2. The highest rate of failure is registered in Prospect 4 for440
both information conditions, probably due to the high number of projects with441
negative value in this prospect (see Hypothesis 4a).442
When comparing the frequency of implementation of the most efficient project443
across information conditions, no significant differences emerge (Wilcoxon Rank444
19 Given that participants did not receive any feedback during the experiment, groups do
not affect choices over the course of the experiment. Consequently, a better measure of project
implementation is obtained by taking into account all possible combinations of bids for a given
project in a given round and not only the bids in each group of three participants. This implies
that, in each round and for each project, 103 and 93 triplets of bids are obtained in the public
and private information conditions, respectively.
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Sum tests, all p-values > 0.255).20 Similarly, no significant differences are ob-445
served when comparing failure frequencies for all projects across the two con-446
ditions (Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests, all p-values > 0.289). These results provide447
strong evidence against Hypothesis 1.448
The comparison of implementation frequencies of the most efficient project449
across prospects highlights some significant differences. In the public information450
condition, we register highly significant differences when comparing Prospect 2 to451
Prospects 3 and 4 (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p-values equal to 0.021 and 0.031,452
respectively). These results support our Hypotheses 3 and 4b.453
Weakly significant differences are registered when comparing Prospect 3 to454
Prospect 1 and Prospect 5 (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p-values equal to 0.065455
and 0.051, respectively). In the private information condition, we register a weakly456
significant difference when comparing Prospect 4 to Prospect 3 (Wilcoxon Signed457
Rank test, p-value equal to 0.072). These results support Hypotheses 3 and 5.458
3.4 Regression Analysis459
The descriptive analysis reported above underlines some patterns of behaviour460
with respect to bidding and project implementation. In this section, a regres-461
sion analysis investigates the determinants of bidding behaviour, with particular462
attention paid to deviations from personal values. A better understanding of bid-463
ding behaviour provides us with insights about the source of surplus creation and464
project implementation.465
Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis based on a linear mixed-466
effects model with random effects to control for repeated observations at the in-467
dividual level. The dependent variable in the model is the relative deviation of468
bids (bi) from personal values (vi) expressed in percentage terms. A positive sign469
20 To warrant independence of observations, we computed the frequency of implementation
of the socially most desirable projects at the group level for both information conditions. The
difference in the central tendencies of the distributions thus computed was then tested with
the support of a non parametric test. The same procedure was followed for the other tests
reported in this section.
19
for the dependent variable identifies overbidding, while a negative sign identifies470
underbidding.21 The dependent variable is regressed on the following explanatory471
variables: Personal.value is the personal value assigned to a subject for the project;472
Project.cost is the cost of the project; Personal.values.SD is the standard devia-473
tion of personal values for the project considered; Personal.value.NEG is equal to474
1 if the personal value is negative, and is equal to 0 otherwise; Soc.benefit is the475
social benefit and measures the efficiency of the project; Public.info is equal to 1476
for the public information setting, and it is equal to 0 for the private information477
setting; Round, indicates in which of the 15 rounds choices were made. In addition478
to main effects, some interactions between explanatory factors are considered in479
the regression, with particular attention paid to the impact of public information.480
Finally, Prospect # provides us with a control on the prospect in which bids were481
collected.482
[Table 3 about here]483
The regression output reported in Table 3 confirms the overall tendency to484
underbid, as can be seen from the negative and highly significant intercept co-485
efficient. Furthermore, as shown by the coefficient of Personal.value.NEG, more486
aggressive underbidding is registered among those with negative personal values487
(in support of Hypothesis 4a). When personal values fall in the positive domain,488
an increase in personal values reduces relative underbidding (Personal.value). By489
contrast, higher negative personal values trigger stronger relative underbidding490
(Pers.value×Pers.val.NEG). Both higher costs for the project (Project.cost) and491
higher variance in personal values (Personal.values.SD) foster relative underbid-492
ding (evidence in support of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, respectively).493
Concerning the impact of information, common knowledge of others’ values has494
a significant impact on bidding behaviour via awareness of the variance in personal495
values (Pers.val.SD×Public.info), but not via awareness of the social benefits gen-496
21 The dependent variable Rel.devi =
bi−vi
|vi| × 100 cannot be computed for those having
a personal value equal to zero. Accordingly, the regression analysis is conducted on 5757
observations out of the 5985 available.
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erated by the projects (Soc.benefit×Public.info) (evidence against Hypothesis 1).497
When compared to the baseline condition provided by Prospect 1, two prospects498
have a significant impact on relative deviations: Prospect 2 strongly promotes un-499
derbidding, while Prospect 3 mitigates deviations from personal values, even if500
only marginally significant.501
4 Discussion and Conclusions502
Based on three requirements for an ethically desirable mechanism to regulate pub-503
lic provision, we have derived a common game format. One could claim—using504
jargon of social psychology—that this game format is procedurally fair. As for505
procedurally fair sports contests, this could crowd-in material opportunism in the506
sense that the parties involved are mainly motivated by their own material, here507
monetary, incentives.508
Although bidding personal values would seem an obvious simple heuristic that509
would lead to fair and efficient outcomes, this is hardly ever observed. Rather,510
nearly all participants understood the incentives for strategic underbidding and511
yielded to them.512
Our experimental setting allows us to identify a few project characteristics513
affecting underbidding and, as a consequence, creation of surplus. In particular,514
underbidding seems to be weaker for positive than for negative personal values.515
Moreover, higher positive personal values induce less relative underbidding, while516
the opposite holds for negative values.517
With respect to the impact of information, we observe common knowledge of518
others’ values to induce more underbidding for a given level of dispersion in per-519
sonal values. In terms of surplus creation, there are no striking differences when520
comparing the private and public information treatments: for both, the most ef-521
ficient project is most frequently implemented, with rates comparable to those522
reported by Gu¨th et al. (2011). Outcome-based social preferences should affect523
behaviour in the public information condition only. The overall consistency of524
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behaviour and outcomes across information treatments suggests that in our com-525
plex and thereby more realistic setting, social preferences of this kind do not play a526
relevant role and are, possibly, crowded-out by the procedural fairness of the mech-527
anism. However, further research is needed to understand how the two concepts528
of fairness interact and when they matter.529
When assessing behaviour across prospects, a few patterns emerge. First, Prospect530
3, characterised by homogeneous positive personal values, is the prospect most531
frequently resulting in the most efficient project. Second, in Prospect 5 there is532
a competing project which is similar in terms of social benefits to the most effi-533
cient project. This seems to negatively affect implementation of the most efficient534
project, in line with the hypothesis of a positive impact of saliency on implementa-535
tion. Third, Prospect 2 provides a larger underbidding margin before endangering536
implementation of efficient projects.22 Accordingly, participants underbid more,537
on average, in this prospect than in others. For this prospect, the general ten-538
dency to underbid less, in relative terms, for lower project costs is countervailed539
by strategic considerations triggered by underbidding margin.540
Altogether, heterogeneity in personal values and negative values seem to en-541
danger implementation of efficient projects. Knowing the value of others does not542
seem to matter much as one mainly conditions on her own value when bidding.543
With heterogeneous personal values, projects with very high social benefits are544
less endangered by underbidding than projects with positive, but smaller, social545
benefits.546
Some inefficiency due to the difficulties to coordinate underbidding had to be547
expected since the mechanism, as characterised by the three requirements, is not548
incentive-compatible. Nevertheless, large social benefits serve as a safeguard, al-549
lowing provision even in case of underbidding. Altogether, our experiment reveals550
some surprising practical functionality of the proposed mechanism which guaran-551
22 As a measure of underbidding margin, we compute the relative underbid which, when
jointly implemented, generates nil surplus. In Prospect 2, the average underbidding margin
across projects is equal to 0.339, while for other prospect the same measure is always smaller
than 0.250.
22
tees citizen sovereignty in public provision, similar to what happens for private552
goods, and generally warrants the implementation of the most efficient projects.553
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5 Instructions (Translated)633
Welcome to this experiment! You will receive e5.00 for showing-up on time.634
We kindly ask you to read the instructions carefully. Communication with other635
participants is not permitted during the experiment. If you have doubts or if you636
want to ask a question, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come and637
answer your question. Please switch off your mobile phones. If you do not comply638
with these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will639
not get any payment.640
How much you are going to earn will depend upon your decisions and also641
upon decisions of other participants. Both your choices and choices of the others642
will remain anonymous and will never be associated to your name.643
During the experiment, all monetary amounts are expressed in ECU (experi-644
mental currency units) and not in Euro. At the end of the experiment 1 ECU will645
be exchanged with 1 Euro.646
In the experiment you are matched with two more participants whose identity647
will not be revealed. The three participants in a group are called Participant 1,648
Participant 2, and Participant 3. You will be told whether you are Participant 1,649
Participant 2 or Participant 3 in the upper right-hand corner of the screen.650
The experiment extends over 15 rounds. At the end of the experiment, only651
one of the 15 rounds is randomly drawn to compute your actual earnings in the652
experiment.653
The interaction in each round654
In each of the 15 rounds, 7 projects with their corresponding costs and personal655
values are going to be displayed on your screen. The structure of the screen is656
the same in each round, but the costs and personal values associated with the657
different projects may vary in each round. Of the seven projects three are single658
projects and four are combinations of single projects. For each project you are659
given information about the cost associated with its implementation and about660
your personal evaluation of the project. The evaluation of the project is a positive661
number if you gain from its implementation and a negative number if you suffer662
a loss from its implementation. This number is called personal value (Vi). [Public663
Information only] You are also informed about the personal values of the other664
two participants in your group. Based on the information you are given, you are665
requested to submit a bid (bi) for each project. Your bids and the bids of the two666
other participants in your group determine your payoff. Bids can be expressed only667
as integer values, either positive or negative (for example: ...,-1, 0, 1,...).668
Payoffs669
The surplus of each project is defined as the difference between the sum of the bids670
for that project by the three participants in a group (b1 + b2 + b3) and the cost of671
that project (c). Thus, the surplus is given by the formula S = (b1 + b2 + b3)− c.672
The project with the highest non-negative surplus is implemented. If the highest673
surplus is negative, no project is implemented and your payoff will be 0 ECU.674
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When a project is implemented, the earnings of a participant are determined675
as follows:676
– You receive your value (Vi) for the chosen project plus one third of the surplus677
of the chosen project (S/3)678
– From this we subtract your bid for the chosen project679
– Therefore you earn in total: Vi + S/3− bi680
The following is an example of the kind of computer screen you will see during681
the experiment:682
683
In the Public Information condition the values of the other participants are dis-684
played on the screen.685
Suppose you are Participant 1 and consider your choice for project A. If the686
project were implemented, it would cost 15 ECU. You have a negative personal687
value for the project (-12). If the project were implemented, you would suffer a688
damage of 12 ECU. You must bid for the project. The amount you bid is relevant689
for the implementation of the project and for the amount you will have to pay690
or you will receive if the project is implemented. Suppose that the overall surplus691
of this project amounts to 30 ECU and that this is the highest surplus. This692
means that Project A is implemented. Each participant gets an equal share of the693
surplus thus, each member of the group receives 10 ECU. If you bid -14 ECU for694
the project, your payoff is calculated as follows: -12 + 10 - (-14) = 12. It is made695
up of the following elements: in your role as Participant 1, you will suffer a damage696
of V1 = -12 ECU from project A, your share of the surplus is 10 ECU and you697
have bid -14 ECU. Since 1 ECU equals 1 Euro, you would earn 12 Euro.698
As a second example, suppose that Project B had the highest surplus and is,699
thus, implemented. Assume, furthermore, that the overall surplus of the project700
28
is 6 ECU. If your bid was 13 ECU, your payoff will be 13+2-13=2 ECU. You will701
have to bid for all seven projects in the column “My bid”.702
It can be the case that the payoff for one or more participants is negative.703
However, this can only occur if the participant submits a bid that is higher than704
his personal value, that is bi > Vi (for instance, when the personal value Vi for the705
project is 17 and the bid bi is larger than 17 or when the personal value Vi for the706
project is -10 and the bid bi is larger than -10). If you submit a bid equal to your707
personal value or lower, you cannot get a negative payoff. If you, nevertheless, get708
a negative payoff, this will be dealt with in the following way:709
– first, the amount you lose will be deducted from the 5 Euro that you receive710
for showing-up on time711
– if your negative payoff exceeds 5 Euro, there are two alternatives. The first is712
that you pay the difference out of your own pocket. The second is that you713
carry out an additional task before you leave the laboratory to make up for714
the remaining difference. This additional task consists of looking for a specified715
letter in a longer text and counting the number of times it occurs. You will get716
1.00 Euro for each sentence that you process correctly. Please note that the717
task is for settlement of potential negative payoffs only. Under no circumstance718
is it possible to carry out the task to increase a positive payoff.719
Final payment720
At the end of the experiment, one of the 15 rounds is randomly drawn for payment.721
You are going to be informed about:722
1. the project which was implemented in that round (if any);723
2. the surplus of the project;724
3. your own bid;725
4. your personal value;726
5. and your payoff.727
This information will only be displayed for the round that was randomly drawn.728
You will not be given any information on the bids of the other members of your729
group or on whether any project was implemented in the other rounds.730
The payoff in the randomly drawn round is converted in Euro (for example,731
15 ECU are 15 Euro). Your earnings will be privately paid in in cash, so that no732
other participant will know the size of your pay-out.733
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6 Tables734
Table 1 Prospects
Project C(S) v1(S) v2(S) v3(S) SB(S)
Prospect 1
A 30.00 30.00 -30.00 45.00 15.00
B 60.00 0.00 24.00 45.00 9.00
C 36.00 6.00 18.00 18.00 6.00
AB 90.00 30.00 -6.00 105.00 39.00
AC 45.00 36.00 -12.00 75.00 54.00
BC 96.00 6.00 42.00 63.00 15.00
ABC 135.00 36.00 12.00 75.00 -12.00
Prospect 2
A 15.00 27.00 18.00 -15.00 15.00
B 30.00 27.00 0.00 12.00 9.00
C 18.00 9.00 6.00 9.00 6.00
AB 45.00 -6.00 30.00 60.00 39.00
AC 24.00 60.00 -12.00 30.00 54.00
BC 48.00 33.00 3.00 27.00 15.00
ABC 69.00 33.00 18.00 6.00 -12.00
Prospect 3
A 30.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
B 63.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 9.00
C 48.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 6.00
AB 105.00 48.00 48.00 48.00 39.00
AC 45.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 54.00
BC 93.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 15.00
ABC 138.00 42.00 42.00 42.00 -12.00
Prospect 4
A 30.00 -24.00 -30.00 -6.00 -90.00
B 60.00 0.00 24.00 45.00 9.00
C 36.00 6.00 18.00 18.00 6.00
AB 90.00 -24.00 -6.00 36.00 -84.00
AC 45.00 -18.00 -12.00 12.00 -63.00
BC 96.00 18.00 60.00 72.00 54.00
ABC 135.00 -9.00 33.00 75.00 -36.00
Prospect 5
A 30.00 78.00 -30.00 -12.00 6.00
B 60.00 0.00 24.00 45.00 9.00
C 36.00 -6.00 18.00 18.00 -6.00
AB 63.00 30.00 -18.00 105.00 54.00
AC 45.00 6.00 -24.00 105.00 42.00
BC 57.00 15.00 42.00 60.00 60.00
ABC 141.00 72.00 12.00 51.00 -6.00
Notes: The table shows the five different prospects, each one including seven projects, from A to
ABC, among which one might be chosen for implementation. For each project, C(S) represents the
cost associated to its implementation, while v1(S), v2(S), and v3(S) are the personal values of
participant 1, 2, and 3 for a given project, respectively. SB(S) is the social benefit, namely the sum
of personal values of participants 1, 2, and 3 minus the cost.
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Table 2 Frequency of Project Implementation
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 3 Prospect 4 Prospect 5
% Publ Priv Publ Priv Publ Priv Publ Priv Publ Priv
None 19.9 21.9 10.0 8.2 17.5 11.7 27.0 36.3 9.2 10.7
A 1.8 2.2 4.3 3.5 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.0
B 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.1 0.1 0.0
C 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
AB 12.5 9.6 23.4 28.6 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 29.3 18.8
AC 62.7 65.9 59.4 59.3 79.2 87.8 0.0 0.0 2.7 4.9
BC 2.5 0.0 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 69.3 61.5 56.3 63.5
ABC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: The table reports the frequencies of implementation for each project in all five prospects.
The private and the public information treatments are kept separate in the table.
A bold font identifies the project with the highest social benefits for a given prospect.
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Table 3 Determinants of relative deviations (linear mixed-effects model)
Rel.dev∼ Coef (Std. Err.)
(Intercept) -55.379 (7.695)***
Personal.value 0.743 (0.056)***
Project.cost -0.205 (0.033)***
Personal.values.SD -0.210 (0.107)*
Personal.value.NEG -15.297 (5.417)**
Soc.benefit 0.102 (0.048)*
Public.info 6.819 (9.282)
Round -0.154 (0.239)
Pers.value×Pers.val.NEG -3.932 (0.276)***
Pers.val.SD×Public.info -0.300 (0.103)**
Soc.benefit×Public.info -0.051 (0.055)
Prospect 2 -9.477 (3.398)**
Prospect 3 7.156 (4.224)◦
Prospect 4 5.653 (3.578)
Prospect 5 -0.562 (3.303)
Num. Obs. 5757 (Subj=57)
Wald χ2 (p-value) < 0.001
Notes: The dependent variable is the relative deviation of bids from personal values
expressed in percentage terms; Personal.value captures the personal value assigned to a
subject for the project; Project.cost captures the cost of the project; Personal.values.SD is
the standard deviation of personal values for the project considered; Personal.value.NEG is
equal to 1 if the personal value is negative, and to 0 otherwise; Soc.benefit captures social
benefits of the project; Public.info is equal to 1 for the public information setting, and to 0
for the private information setting; Round, indicates in which of the 15 rounds choices were
made. Three interaction terms between explanatory factors are then added in the regression
and Prospect # denotes the prospect in which bids were collected.
Significance levels: *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; ◦ 0.1
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7 Figures735
Fig. 1 Bids (Private Information)
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Notes: The figure reports the boxplots of the distributions of bids. Each cell corresponds to a
project (from A to ABC) of a specific prospect (from 1 to 5). The three boxplots portray the
distributions of bids for each individual personal value, with the first plot from left referring
to v1(S) and the last plot from left to v3(S). The filled circle in each boxplot represent the
personal value. Values refer to the private information treatment.
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Fig. 2 Bids (Public Information)
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Notes: The figure reports the boxplots of the distributions of bids. Each cell corresponds to a
project (from A to ABC) of a specific prospect (from 1 to 5). The three boxplots portray the
distributions of bids for each individual personal value, with the first plot from left referring
to v1(S) and the last plot from left to v3(S). The filled circle in each boxplot represent the
personal value. The values refer to the public information treatment.
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Fig. 3 Relative Deviations
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the individual-level average relative deviation of
the bid from the personal value: Ri =
bi−vi
|vi| . The dashed horizontal line separates the
overbidding area (above the line) from the underbidding area (below the line).
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Fig. 4 Surplus
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Notes: The figure reports the surplus (sum of the bids minus the cost for the project) and the
social benefit (sum of the personal values minus the cost) for all projects within a prospect.
